Physic hath
three parts, whereof two respect nature united or collected, the
third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is
collected either into one entire total, or else into the same
principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the
contexture or configuration of things, as de mundo, de universitate
rerum. The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or
originals of things. The third is the doctrine concerning all
variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing
substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there
needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or paraphrase
that attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these three I
cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they
are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they are parts of
knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.
(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal
and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may
seem to be nugatory and void, because of the received and inveterate
opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out
essential forms or true differences; of which opinion we will take
this hold, that the invention of forms is of all other parts of
knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found.
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