And thus much for metaphysic; the
latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his
proper place.
VIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of natural
philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth
rank with physic special and metaphysic, which is mathematic; but I
think it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of
order, to place it as a branch of metaphysic. For the subject of it
being quantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative,
and belongeth to philosophia prima (as hath been said), but quantity
determined or proportionable, it appeareth to be one of the
essential forms of things, as that that is causative in Nature of a
number of effects; insomuch as we see in the schools both of
Democritus and of Pythagoras that the one did ascribe figure to the
first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the
principles and originals of things. And it is true also that of all
other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most abstracted and
separable from matter, and therefore most proper to metaphysic;
which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured
and inquired than any of the other forms, which are more immersed in
matter.
Pages:
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192