Nevertheless, because I find not any science that
doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to
alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a
pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty thereof. And if
it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the
imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider
of the imagination. No more than we shall speak now of such
knowledges as reason produceth (for that extendeth to all
philosophy), but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the
faculty of reason: so as poesy had his true place. As for the
power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the
same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto most
fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative
reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer
it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with
the former division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the
faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral.
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