XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the
natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a
coincidence with invention; for all inductions, whether in good or
vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth--
all one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism,
for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the
mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another;
the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real
and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have
spoken of interpretation of Nature.
(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most
agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end
excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely covet to
have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable, and as a
rest and support of the mind. And, therefore, as Aristotle
endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point
quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas
(that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant
of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is
accomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or
axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a
perpetual peril of falling.
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