So as it is almost
necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the
wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning
the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we
accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no.
For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end
there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and
differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must be
confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these
fallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from
our nature and condition of life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution
of them (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth
extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular
elenches or cautions against these three false appearances I find
altogether deficient.
(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which
to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that
also deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of
proofs to the differing kinds of subjects.
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