Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth
to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or
culture of the mind: the one describing the nature of good, the
other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the
will of man thereunto.
(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth
it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the
degrees of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputatious
which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term
felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning
which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith
discharged. And as Aristotle saith, "That young men may be happy,
but not otherwise but by hope;" so we must all acknowledge our
minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future
world.
(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the
philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of
man's nature than was (for we see in what height of style Seneca
writeth, Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei),
we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their
inquiries and labours.
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